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WHAT TO DO WITH BIN LADEN AND
AL QAEDA TERRORISTS?: A QUALIFIED
DEFENSE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND
UNITED STATES POLICY ON DETAINEES AT
GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL BASE
KENNETH ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has successfully brought down the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. Together with increasing law-
enforcement arrests and detentions of individuals alleged to be
connected with the planning or execution of the attacks of
September 11, the American military accomplishment has now
pressed into the foreground essential moral, legal, and political
questions about how those detained and accused of terrorist
activity should be treated. Who should try them? What is the
appropriate jurisdiction and authority? What rights do they
have?
Proposals for how to treat the most serious category of
suspects- those believed to have been involved in the planning
or execution of the September 11 attacks-have fallen into three
main camps. The first group has called for having them tried
by international tribunals. Such proposals have included:
extending the jurisdiction of the current Yugoslavia tribunal to
cover the September 11 attacks and its Al Qaeda sponsors,
establishing a new ad hoc tribunal under the authority of the
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Security Council, or amending the terms of the not-yet-in-force
International Criminal Court to allow it to begin hearing
terrorist cases. Second, many commentators, especially in the
United States, have called for terrorist suspects, no matter
where they are found, to be tried in United States district courts
for applicable violations of United States and international
criminal law. Third, the Bush Administration has announced
plans, pursuant to a Military Order signed by the President in
his capacity as Commander in Chief, to create the option of
trying non-citizen suspects in specially created "military
commissions."'
The Military Order has provoked a storm of protest from
various civil libertarians, civil and human rights organizations,
newspaper editorialists, academics, members of Congress, and
sundry others, mostly on the political left,2 but including some
prominent conservatives such as New York Times columnist
William Safire3 and Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.).4 Combined with
related criticism of other domestic security measures enacted
by Congress in the wake of the attacks or put in place by the
Bush Administration largely through actions by Attorney
General John Ashcroft, protest over military tribunals and
other perceived restrictions of civil liberties has constituted
most of the domestic dissent from the Bush Administration's
conduct in the wake of September 11.
Seemingly surprised by this criticism, the Bush
Administration has moved to mollify opponents by promising
additional regulations outlining the actual procedures for the
military commissions (to be drafted by the General Counsel of
1. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism § 2(A)(1)(i)-(iii), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (2001)
[hereinafter Military Order].
2- See, e.g., Detentions: First Find Your Suspect; A Wider Net and New Military
Tribunals, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17-23, 2001, at 30 ("Civil libertarians were further
exercised on November 13th by an announcement that President George Bush had
signed an order allowing special military tribunals to try foreigners charged with
terrorism.").
3. See, e.g., William Safire, Editorial, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2001, at A16; see also William Safire, Editorial, Kangaroo Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2001, at A19; William Safire, Editorial, Voices of Negativism, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2001, at A29.
4. See Jess Bravin & Keith Johnson, Military-Tribunal Plan for Terror Suspects Runs
Into Resistance From Allies, Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2001, at Al, ("On the
House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Bob Barr (R., Ga.) has joined the committee's
senior Democrat, Michigan Rep. John Conyers Jr., in calling for hearings on the
tribunal plan.").
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the Department of Defense). The regulations apparently will
provide for greater procedural protection than the original
order requires.' The Bush Administration has also moved,
however, to challenge critics on grounds of national security
and war-time exigency. In hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, for example, Attorney General John Ashcroft
"bluntly [told] lawmakers that their 'power of oversight is not
without limit,' and that, in some areas, 'I cannot and will not
consult with you."'6
The aim of this Article is to give a qualified defense of the
use of military commissions to try, as the Military Order says,
"Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,"7
including their use to determine the legal status of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. It is a highly qualified defense of
military commissions, in that it does not seek to defend the
actual terms of the Military Order, but instead simply the
concept of military commissions as such.
Moreover, this Article leaves aside all the other domestic
security policies that resemble the contours of a national.
security state modeled on the least attractive years of the Cold
War. Indeed, a fundamental reason for supporting the making
of war outside the United States is to prevent the erosion of our
domestic arrangements and civil liberties by instead destroying
those abroad who would bring war to this society, for it is
better to make war on our enemies abroad and to destroy them
and their threat than to create a long-term police and
surveillance state at home. Quite possibly this is a fool's hope;
the Bush Administration, consistent with the pattern of
American governments across our history in time of war,
including the administrations of great presidents such as
Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, has sought to make war
abroad a basis for constricting civil liberties at home. For the
most part, this approach must be opposed.
Yet, imperfect as the Military Order is (one hopes those
drafting the final regulations in the Pentagon will have learned
5. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30,2001, at A25 (promising that the Military Order will be interpreted
to give full and fair trials in military commissions).
6. Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Scraps With Senators Over Tribunals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7,2001, at A3.
7. Military Order, supra note 1.
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from the controversy), the fundamental concept of using
military commissions is morally, politically, and legally
justified. They can be shaped and made to work consistent with
the Constitution, international law, and particularly the Geneva
Conventions, to which the United States and its military are
deeply and correctly committed. They-not international
tribunals nor even ordinary United States district courts -
ought to be the vehicle for the trial and punishment of at least
the most serious categories of alleged terrorists, i.e., those who
by their conduct and ideology have made themselves not
merely criminals but our enemies.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
A. The Liberal Internationalist Argument For
an International Tribunal
The argument in favor of using international tribunals to try
suspected terrorists can be made on either of two grounds, one
broad and one narrow. The broad ground is that of liberal
internationalism. The crimes committed by the terrorists are, it
could be said, crimes against the world at large and offenses
against universal morality as reflected in international law.
They should therefore be tried for those international offenses
and, moreover, those who try them should have and be seen to
have the impartiality that is presumed to come with
international rather than merely national institutions of justice.8
Liberal internationalists conclude that the appropriate forum
for trying accused terrorists ought to be some form of
international tribunal, convened under the authority of some
international body, rather than simply the national courts of the
United States.
This approach is particularly attractive to "global elites," for
whom "national" is synonymous with "parochial" and, indeed,
practically synonymous with "illegitimate." More precisely,
these groups instinctively favor international tribunals because
they view "international" as synonymous with "universal." To
support international tribunals is to promote a universal sense
8. The most persuasive recent statement of the general argument for
international tribunals is found in GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF
VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000).
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of justice and morality, most nobly embodied in the various
declarations of universal human rights.9 For these folks-
including many members of the international non-
governmental organization (NGO) movement that generated
support for international tribunals to deal with the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda-advocating
international tribunals is not a policy choice, but rather a
cultural preference, more akin to a dietary taste or a religious
choice than an argument deduced from empirical reason.'
Universality is believed to be inherently more ethical;
international institutions and mechanisms incarnate the
universal in ways that, it is assumed, merely national or local
institutions and mechanisms cannot. Therefore they hold a
profound belief in the goodness of a federal world, a world in
which local and national institutions must finally be
subordinate to international ones.
It is difficult to argue against liberal internationalism, and the
reflexive endorsement of international and supranational
institutions that it inspires, for the simple reason that the
position is simply presumed to be universal. The debate
between liberal internationalism and its principal rival,
democratic sovereignty, resembles ships passing in the night.
Nonetheless, it cannot have escaped the attention of the most
fervid liberal internationalist that, as Dominique Moisi, a
leading French political commentator, observed in assessing
winners and losers among institutions following September 11:
[t]he first beneficiary... is, undeniably, the institution of the
state. In the post-cold-war global age, the state's legitimacy
and competence appeared to be waning. Caught between
the emergence of civil society and the growing power of
transnational corporations, the state appeared to be fighting
a rearguard battle. Now, with security a priority, it is back
with a vengeance."
Accordingly, the immediate reply to the "broad" liberal
9. See Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy:
Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations With International
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 371, 374 (2001) ("[Tlhat
universality must equal the international... is at best unsupported.").
10. See generally Kenneth Anderson, Secular Eschatologies of the Internationalized
New Class, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 107 (Peter
Juviler & Carrie Gustafson eds., 1999).
11. Dominique Moisi, Editorial, Early Winners and Losers in a Time of War, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 2001, at 15.
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internationalist call for international tribunals to try terrorists is
that in a world in which people in the United States, in Europe,
and elsewhere have immediately looked to their nation states
for security and justice, the virtue of international tribunals is
not obvious. Supporters tend to be academics, journalists, or
members of the international NGO community. But it is
striking how very little support they have elicited from the
European Union, despite its enthusiasm for both the ad hoc
tribunals dealing with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and
the nascent International Criminal Court. Few government
press statements support international tribunals either. My
private contacts among European diplomats have told me that
the reason is security. Governments do not want the burden of
hosting an international tribunal or, perhaps worse, being
responsible for the imprisonment of convicted terrorists for
long periods of time. They would much rather see the United
States bear these risks.
B. The Obligations of Democratic Sovereignty
Even if their motivation is self-interest, allowing the United
States to make the decisions and bear the security risks is
morally correct. Whatever the outcome of the grand argument
between liberal internationalism and democratic sovereignty, it
is both the privilege and the awful responsibility of the United
States to deal with those alleged to have planned or
participated in the September 11 attacks. The tragedy certainly
involved universally reprehensible crimes, such as making
civilians both the means and object of attack. But
fundamentally, September 11 was not an attack upon the whole
world; it was an attack upon the United States, its territory,
property, and people. A democratic polity owes to its members
and citizens a good faith effort to protect them and do justice
on their behalf, and it would be morally wrong for the United
States, in a misguided attempt to provide "universal" justice
through supposedly "universal" institutions, to seek to avoid
this burden and refer it to international institutions.
Nor should the United States be swayed by arguments that
only international bodies can provide "impartiality" and the
appearance of "impartial" justice. Even accepting for
argument's sake that international tribunals could provide
more impartial justice than United States courts would, the
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United States as a democratic polity owes its citizens, its
people, and particularly those who died and lost loved ones,
justice according to United States traditions. It owes our people
our justice, and should see that our justice is done to those who
have attacked us. This principle is the genuine lesson of the
Nuremberg Trials, not the anodyne universalism of liberal
internationalists. It would have been morally contemptible for
the Second World War Allies to have proclaimed, in a fit of,
political correctness, that they should turn the judgment of the
Nazi leaders over to those countries which were neutral and
impartial to have them tried in a genuinely unbiased manner.
On the contrary, partiality can be a moral badge of honor and
goodness. Partiality entitled countries to sit in judgment after
World War II, because it evidenced having fought for the good
rather than letting evil flourish and go unpunished. If there
were to be trials at all, the Allies owed a solemn obligation to
their own and all victims to conduct such procedures
themselves. They earned the right and obligation to conduct
such trials not only because of victory; but also because of their
own payment in blood. 2 This principle remains true today. The
United States owes its democratic community victory in this
war, and the imposition of its justice upon those who would
bring war and crime to its territory and people.
C. The Pragmatic Argument for an International Tribunal:
Legitimacy of an International Tribunal Among the Europeans
The narrow argument for international tribunals rests upon
multilateral rather than supranational or liberal-international
grounds, and is fundamentally pragmatic and strategic in
nature. Even if one does acknowledge that the United States
has the moral right to try September 11 terrorists in its own
institutions of justice, the argument runs, it should nonetheless
cede that right to international tribunals in order to obtain the
advantages of the international legitimacy that would derive
from a trial conducted by international authorities. The
advantage of this approach would be that a trial not held under
12. See Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the
Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. Ris. J. 281,292 (1994) (book review) ("Nuremberg
was a 'lovely hood ornament on the ungainly vehicle that liberated Western
Europe, but it was not a substitute for D-day.' A military victory is not simply a
practical prerequisite to a trial... but a moral necessity.").
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the specifically national auspices of American justice would be
seen by the world as having additional authenticity. The
supposed benefit would be a potential end to the cycle of
violence and revenge, since all parties would acknowledge that
justice had been served.
The fundamental flaw in this argument is that it avoids
asking whose auspices appropriately confer legitimacy. No
doubt European elites would be happy if a trial were held
under international tribunal auspices (if only the security issues
could be resolved). Their satisfaction, however, would merely
derive from a longer-term desire to constrain both United
States power and the American sense of auto-legitimacy
derived from our confidence in our internal, democratic
legitimacy regardless of others' opinions about it. The
European Union has difficulty mustering such democratic
legitimacy. Its elites are in constant vacillation between praise
for the ideal of democracy, contempt for its actual realization in
America, however imperfect, and anxiety over its absence, now
and seemingly forever, at the level of the European Union. So
why should America care what European elites think?
From a pragmatic American standpoint, too, there is little
benefit to heeding the views of European elites. It is true that
European cooperation in tracking down terrorist cells and
security cooperation is necessary. It is unfortunately especially
necessary, as it turns out, that the seed beds of forces attacking
America lie nearly as much in the despised immigrant Islamic
communities that live at the margins of European societies-
supposedly so vastly morally superior to America, but whose
Muslim populations, from Britain to Germany, are
systematically shut out of post-Christian Europe and shut in
upon themselves-as in the corrupt regimes where the
terrorists were born. It is an exaggeration, but not entirely so,
that the United States could have done worse in dealing with
Al Qaeda by simply attacking, for example, Belgium, Germany,
and Italy-attacking Al Qaeda's strongholds among those who
live in the shadows of a world they do not share.
European military forces, likewise although effectively
useless in battle, can be helpful in long-term peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan. Europe can also assist in tracking
down and seizing the financial assets of terrorists. These are
important advantages, but one must still understand the
[Vol. 25
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fundamentally self-centered nature of European support, given
its underlying desire to constrain American power in pursuit of
its own counter-hegemonic aspirations.
Hence, Europe's endorsement for America's coalition against
terror is merely "in return for the privilege of restraining the
United States from actions that it might otherwise take."13 This
perspective is as true now as it was before September 11. In
addition, Europeans are keenly aware that the "coalition"
against terrorism, despite all its fine multilateral phraseology,
is the greatest adventure in American unilateralism in decades.
America's refusal to join the fashionable projects of utopian
international law-the ICC, Kyoto Protocols, etc.-pale by
comparison. The early, but now eroding, steadfastness of the
principal European leaders, Schroeder, Chirac, and Blair, in
support of the Afghan war cannot conceal the fact that
European elites will likely continue to embrace a rhetorical and
substantive anti-Americanism. As Leon Wieseltier put it with
respect to the perpetrators of September 11 and attempts by
various European commentators to put the blame on America,
"nothing changes a regressive creed into a progressive creed so
quickly as the appearance within in it of anti-Americanism." 4
Meanwhile, a review of European media perspectives reveals,
as Dominique Moisi says, that following the immediate shock
of September 11:
The media seemed to lose faith in the war after only three
weeks. Like television viewers impatiently zapping from
channel to channel, commentators have been quick to
identify failure and to denounce the human cost of the
American bombings. Many seemed almost dismayed by the
scenes of joy in liberated Kabul.... In France, for example,
the media's early solidarity-the sense that we are all
Americans-has slowly given way to a rampant and
13. Kenneth Anderson, Language, Law and Terror, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT
(London), Sept. 21, 2001, at 13.
14. Leon Wieseltier, Washington Diarist: The Incoherence, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 46 (responding to what Wieseltier called the "hilarious October 4
issue of the London Review of Books, the one with the parade of progressive
professors adrift in an ether of representations and signifiers."). "Appalling"
would be more accurate than "hilarious," as exemplified by Cambridge professor
Mary Beard announcing "the feeling, however tactfully you dress it up, the
United States had it coming." Tariq Ali et. al., LONDON REV. OF BOOKs, 11
September: Some LRB Writers Reflect on the Reasons and Consequences, Oct. 4, 2001, at
20.
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immature anti-Americanism.15
D. Legitimacy of an International Tribunal Among Muslims
If legitimacy according to the Europeans is relatively
insignificant, given that their elites will never be persuaded to
genuinely like American policy,'6 then perhaps the opinions of
the Muslim world should be considered more closely? Harvard
Law School professor and president-elect of the American
Society of International Law Anne-Marie Slaughter presents a
formidable argument:
George W. Bush appears to assume that the next step [for
captured terrorists] would be trial in US courts. Such a
course .. .would have enormous legitimacy problems for
many other countries .... In effect, it would proclaim the US
to be not only the world's policeman but also the world's
judicial system. A better alternative is some kind of
international tribunal to work in conjunction with national
courts around the world... [such as] an ad hoc international
tribunal with jurisdiction over all terrorist acts on or after
September 11, wherever committed.
Slaughter is careful to support creation of an ad hoc tribunal,
under the authority of the U.N. Security Council (like the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) on purely
pragmatic grounds. She does not argue from broad ideological
assumptions of liberal internationalism, but instead urges that
it is in the interests of the United States to hand over terrorist
cases to an international tribunal. She offers four justifications.
First, Islamic governments "would find it easier to surrender
suspected terrorists to a global court," particularly one that
included, as she also urges, "judges from the Muslim faith and
Islamic legal systems."' 8 Second, "a global court could try
terrorists according to internationally agreed standards of
evidence for crimes under not only national, but also
15. Moisi, supra note 11, at 15.
16. In addition, a sizable part of American elites and especially its intellectuals
will continue desperately to seek approval from European elites, on the seemingly
eternal ground that Europe is supposedly civilized, and America supposedly is
not. Relations between Europe and America at the level of intellectuals, let it be
said, have never really advanced beyond the novels of Henry James.
17. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Editorial, Terrorism and justice, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 12, 2001, at 15.
18. Id.
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international law." 9 Third, "the judgments of a global court-
not only criminal prosecutions, but probably also fines,
injunctions and orders freezing assets-would be easier to
enforce in the national courts of many countries where they
would have to be enforced to wage a global fight."20 Fourth,
"an international tribunal for terrorism would work together
with national courts around the world, much like the proposed
International Criminal Court is supposed to do... [F]or certain
masterminds of crimes against the global community, the
international tribunal would be available."'
Her argument is pragmatically appealing, but flawed. In the
first place, it seems extremely doubtful that an international
tribunal, even one with Muslim judges on it, would have
legitimacy within the Muslim world. As University of Chicago
law professors Jack Goldsmith and Bernard Meltzer note,
[i]t is doubtful that a multi-ethnic international tribunal
would make much difference to those who now believe that
US actions are unjust. The nations that would establish the
tribunal have already condemned Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda for September 11. Bin Laden's sympathizers would
probably view the tribunal as many Serbs view the United
Nations-sponsored, multi-ethnic international tribunal at
The Hague: as a biased tool of western power.22
Indeed, as Goldsmith and Meltzer also note, trial before an
international tribunal could turn into a springboard for bin
Laden and his associates to portray themselves as martyrs. In
their words,
[s]uch a trial would... enhance Mr. bin Laden's stature and
appeal. He and other terrorists would use the event as a
platform to attack the US's culture, motives and policies -an
attack that would reverberate throughout the Muslim world.
Any dissent from a guilty verdict would weaken the
judgment's legitimacy and... increase the terrorists' power
and prestige. Acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence
would.., be possible, especially if protection of intelligence




22. Jack Goldsmith & Bernard Meltzer, Editorial, Swift Justice for bin Laden, FIN.
TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 2001, at 15. Professor Meltzer served as assistant trial
counsel at the Nuremberg International War Trials.
23. Id.
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It is also entirely speculative to imagine how a new
international tribunal could manage to coordinate, order, and
enforce sanctions, asset freezes, and other actions by national
courts. Some judges might comply, but others would not.
Modeling this coordination on the ICC and its proposed
procedures surely seems excessively optimistic given that the
ICC does not even technically exist yet. Moreover, as American
University law professor Paul R. Williams and New England
School of Law professor Michael P. Scharf (both experts in the
workings of the Yugoslavia tribunal) stress, proponents of
international tribunals tend to underestimate the difficulty
inherent in getting them to function, let alone assessing their
eventual effectiveness:
[T]here exists no effective international forums [sic] for the
prosecution of terrorists.... It would take many years to
select a prosecutor and judges, let alone prepare an
indictment against key terrorist figures. In the case of the
Yugoslavia tribunal, it took seven years to indict Slobodan
Milosevic. Likewise, an international terrorism court would
take years to establish and potentially have the same
deficiencies. 24
The idea that the ICC open ahead of schedule to deal with
terrorists-an idea that Slaughter rejects in favor of an ad hoc
international tribunal-seems even more far-fetched. As
Williams and Scharf note, "[w]hile the International Criminal
Court has been mentioned as a possible venue, the treaty
establishing it is not yet in force, its jurisdiction does not
include terrorist crimes, and it does not have retroactive
jurisdiction." 2 Proposals to utilize the ICC appear to be based,
not on United States interests, but instead on a liberal-
internationalist hope for a back-door mechanism to draw the
United States into accepting and joining the ICC, something it
has consistently refused to do.
Justifying an ad hoc international tribunal according to
America's interests through increased legitimacy, coordination,
and effectiveness appears dubious, at best. In particular, from
the standpoint of safeguarding America's practical interests,
Yale Law School professor Ruth Wedgwood observes that
24. Paul R. Williams & Michael P. Scharf, Editorial, Prosecute Terrorists on a
World Stage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,2001, at M5.
25. Id.
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[t]he ad hoc criminal tribunals created for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda by the U.N. Security Council have not enjoyed the
confidence of Western powers in obtaining intelligence
intercepts for use at trial. Americans could not expect to fill
the majority of slots in an ad hoc tribunal, and a trial
chamber of three to five judges might have no Americans at
all. Moreover, the tribunal for Yugoslavia has operated at a
snail's pace, trying only 31 defendants in eight years, at a
cost of $400 million.
26
If the choice is between a forum for trying defendants that
satisfies American demands for legitimacy within its
democratic order, and a forum that cannot possibly fulfill
demands for legitimacy outside of a narrow range of European
public opinion, even on purely pragmatic grounds, the obvious
choice is to use our own justice system.
E. Islam and the Secular Rule of Law
Professor Slaughter advocates, however, not merely an
international tribunal, but a tribunal that explicitly incorporates
Islam as a religion into its jurisprudence. She urges that an
international tribunal
[b]e composed of justices from high courts around the world
and co-chaired by a US. Supreme Court Justice and a
distinguished Islamic jurist of similar rank... A court along
these lines would be mord legitimate than a US national
court. It would help convince countries around the world
that this is indeed a fight about protecting global values
rather than projecting US power. It would be particularly
important for many Muslims because it would recognize the
relevance and value of Islamic law. And acknowledging the
contribution of Islamic jurists would distinguish the values
and rules of Islam from the horrific acts of some of its
practitioners.
Slaughter's proposal is profoundly problematic despite its
superficially sweet sense of multiculturalism and sensitivity. In
the first instance, leaving aside the explicit religious questions,
the war on terrorism is about projecting American power.
While it is pleasing to know that our resources are being used
consistently with the cause of global values, our first priority is
26. Ruth Wedgwood, Editorial, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec.
3,2001, at A18.
27. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 15.
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to ensure that American values and interests are being
furthered. In the words of columnist Mark Steyn: "This is not
the time for Islamic outreach: the U.S. doesn't need to prove it's
nicer than anybody else, just that it's tougher than anybody
else." 28
Second, Slaughter's assertion that matters of fundamental
justice toward dead Americans ought to be addressed by
justices from other nations suggests that all judicial systems are
morally and functionally equivalent. Judicial legitimacy,
however, is not a floating value that can be automatically
solicited by any given tribunal, rather it is exclusively the
product of a healthy democratic system and must be earned
within a democratic polity. Obviously, there are many high
court judges from other countries with integrity and probity
equal to our own, and many of them serve democratic systems.
But it is erroneous to suppose, based upon a sentimental moral
relativism, that this legitimacy can be mechanically extended to
an ad hoc international court without its own democratic
underpinnings, especially in the politically and emotionally
charged cases stemming from terrorist activities. Some judges
will be politicized, and others will see themselves and be seen
by others as representing constituencies (perhaps governments
or religious/ethnic groups). Even those who are not overtly
politicized may come from legal systems whose value systems
are fundamentally incompatible with ours, leading to crucial
differences over such basic concepts as the definition of
terrorism. While such discrepancies would be relatively
inconsequential in purely commercial matters -contracts,
international business, and so on-it is harder to endorse the
theory that having an internationally representative judiciary
increases legitimacy in matters of national security.
Third, Slaughter's call for the explicit reservation of places
for judges of a particular religion, while strategically
understandable in light of her belief that inclusiveness
automatically increases legitimacy, is flawed in principle. The
independence of judicial deliberation is incompatible with the
appointment of judges 'representing' particular constituencies.
Although Slaughter may respond that merely holding a
28. Mark Steyn, Editorial, Hey, George: No More Mr. Nice Guy, SPECTATOR
(London), Nov. 3, 2001, at 18.
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place-in this case co-chief judge-for a particular religionist
does not mean that he or she necessarily represents that
religion, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion. It puts the
individual judge into an untenable position vis-A-vis that
constituency and the larger public. A conviction may be
viewed as a betrayal of the constituency. An acquittal may be
treated as a public betrayal. It is an invitation to a guaranteed
accusation of bad faith and loss of reputation.
Finally, reserving slots for Islamic jurists is profoundly
wrong because it implies that the law of a particular religion
ought to be part of the standard by which a public court judges
guilt or innocence. Slaughter is explicit about this:
"[R]ecognize," she says, "the relevance and value of Islamic
law," not merely in the abstract, but in the formulation of the
tribunal.29
It is also wrong, not only because we reject explicit references
to religion and religious codes in secular justice and
government generally, but because, in the case of Islam, we in
the West have come to reject important tenets of its faith, not
least its view on the role and status of women. There is no way
for Western liberals to elide this fact.30 Is Sharia law concerning
the status of women-whether construed to be truly at odds
with Western feminism or not-relevant to a trial ostensibly
about murder and the slaughter of innocents? Is that not
simply focusing on the cultural preference of Western elites of
the past few years to privilege any issue having to do with the
status of women rather than the fundamental issues of this
trial, which are murder and destruction? Yet it does not seem
likely that Islamic law is neatly divisible -least of all in seeking
to select a Muslim judge with properly "liberal" views on
important issues. The act of selecting a judge on the basis of
religion also inevitably means that we, outsiders, profane that
religion in choosing an interpretation of it, by choosing its
interpreter. We cannot acknowledge one part of Muslim law
because it is conducive to the ends of this trial, but ignore
another, thereby profaning a legal system inspired, in the eyes
29. Slaughter, supra note 17, at 15.
30. See, e.g., Richard Dowden, This Woman Has Been Sentenced to Death by
Stoning, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 27, 2002, at 28. (Under Sharia law, "in
northern Nigeria, as in Afghanistan under the Taliban, adultery now warrants the
ultimate punishment-for half the couple, anyway.").
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of its adherents, by God by dividing it into what the worldly
and secular find convenient and inconvenient.
The move from religious accommodation to semi-official
inclusion of Islam by Western elites otherwise profoundly
hostile to religion is deeply troubling. It represents a disturbing
co-dependence between the Muslim world and Western elites,
founded upon the principle of victimhood. It suggests that the
widespread idea in the West that Islam is a religion that has
merely yet to come to grips with modernity is at least partly
wrong. On the contrary, Islam is in grave danger of finding a
genuine place within modernity-the place and role of the
eternal victim. It is a position deeply entrenched within
modernity itself, one whose trope is a pas de deux of resentment
and guilt, refined in recent decades into a familiar Western
refrain played out most recently at the Durban conference on
racism.3'
More importantly, it is time to ask the question that Leon
Wieseltier posed to Western elites as to whether the currently
tender regard of the West toward Muslim religious
sensibilities -going beyond tolerance and accommodation to
acknowledging it as a legitimate foundation of government and
as a doctrine to be enforced by the state in the West-is
consistent with Western values or beneficial to ordinary men
and women in the Muslim world:
Against the indecent religious thinking of Osama bin Laden
and Mullah Omar, expert after expert testifies to the decent
religious thinking of other figures in contemporary Islam.
Does this Koranic verse enjoin war? Then that Koranic verse
enjoins peace. The unchallenged premise of both sides in this
debate is that the social and political arrangements of the
Islamic world must forever establish themselves in holy
writ. There is rule by radical imams and there is rule by
moderate imams. What about rule by no imams at all?32
III. TRIALS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
A. Practical Problems With the Organized Crime Model of
31. See generally Arch Puddington, The Wages of Durban: A Carnival of Hate, the
World Conference Against Racism was Also a Prelude to the Events of September 11,
COMMENTARY, Nov. 2001, at 29.
32. Wieseltier, supra note 14, at 48.
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International Terrorism
If international tribunals are both an unrealistic and morally
undesirable dream, trials of suspected terrorists in ordinary
U.S. district courts also carry significant moral and practical
downsides. For one, they merely extend the evident failure of
U.S. policy over the past decade in dealing with terrorism
against U.S. targets: the 1988 Lockerbie, Scotland plane
explosion; the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; the 1996
Khobar Towers attack against U.S. military personnel in Saudi
Arabia; the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa; and finally
the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole. American policy has been to
regard the problem of terrorism against American targets,
whether at home or abroad, as essentially a criminal matter, a
question of long-arm criminal jurisdiction, under the
investigation of the FBI, seeking extradition of suspects for
prosecution by regular Justice Department prosecutors in
ordinary U.S. district court. The CIA, notably, has been far less
important than the FBI, and the Federal effort has been
concentrated on solving past cases and bringing suspects in
them to trial rather than taking intelligence actions aimed at
preventing or deterring future action.
The criminal law approach of seeking to solve past crimes,
and treating terrorism not as an enemy to be battled, but
criminals to book, is primarily defended on the grounds of its
effectiveness. James Orenstein, for example, a former Clinton
Administration Deputy Attorney General, claims that the U.S.
government "has decades of experience and success in using
civilian courts to combat organized crime, and it has
successfully applied that experience to fighting terrorism."33
His evidence for that claim is, first, that the civilian courts have
broad powers to protect information, witnesses, informants,
judges, jurors, and those involved in the judicial process.
Second, the use of prosecutorial techniques developed in
fighting organized crime has taught prosecutors that they can
get testimony in return for deals with low ranking members of
a conspiracy, and that putting defendants on trial together
gives a great ability to show jurors the full extent of the
criminal organization. Third, he says, civilian prosecutions
33. James Orenstein, Editorial, Rooting Out Terrorists Just Became Harder, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6,2001, at A29.
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have obtained convictions in important cases-Sheik Omar
Rahman, for example, in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, or Wadih el-Hage, who was recently convicted (in a
civilian court) for bombing the American embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania," among others.
34
Few share Orenstein's belief in domestic civilian
prosecution's effectiveness, however. More typical would be
the assessment of Paul Williams and Michael Scharf:
In the past, the United States has pursued a failed policy of
domestic prosecution of terrorists. In the cases of the 1996
Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombings of
US embassies in Africa, and Cole attack in 2000, and the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center towers, the U.S. has
been able to prosecute only a handful of low-level culprits
and ideological supporters. With potentially thousands of Al
Qaeda terrorists about to fall into the hands of the U.S.
military or Northern Alliance, this process will neither serve
as adequate justice nor as an effective deterrent to further
acts of terror. More strikingly, domestic prosecution
prevents the early apprehension of terrorists, as was the case
when the Clinton administration declined Sudan's offer in
1996 to turn over Osama bin Laden because there was not
sufficient probable cause to try him in U.S. courts.3
The concerns about the effectiveness and practicality of
civilian courts for trying terrorist suspects thus rest on its poor
record, especially when one considers the scope of the attacks
and their increasing audacity over time. The root sources of its
failure is the process' alleged virtue -the use of models drawn
from the fight against organized crime. Organized crime and
drug smuggling are, however, essentially problems stemming
from material greed. In stark contrast, the motives of Al Qaeda
are apocalyptic and ideological. As Ruth Wedgwood observes:
Perhaps it is only coincidence that the World Trade Center
towers toppled the day before Al Qaeda defendants were
due to be sentenced for the earlier bombings of East Africa
embassies-in a Federal courthouse in lower Manhattan six
blocks away. But certainly before September 11 no one
imagined the gargantuan appetite for violence and revenge
that bin Laden has since exhibited. Endangering America's
34. Id.
35. Williams & Scharf, supra note 24, at M5.
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cities with a repeat performance is a foolish act. 6
What are the limitations of the U.S. federal courts in trying
cases of these kinds? First, there are evidentiary limitations on
what can be introduced in court. Unlike European criminal
courts and the Yugoslavia tribunal-the darlings of
international human rights advocates who are now
complaining of the Bush Administration's plans under the
Military Order-hearsay statements of probative value cannot
be introduced in U.S. district court. Thus, as Wedgwood says,
"bin Laden's telephone call to his mother, telling her that
'something big' was imminent, could not be entered into
evidence if the source of information was his mother's best
friend."" Second, there are limitations on what the intelligence
community, concerned with possible future attacks rather than
punishing past attackers, are willing to publish in open court.
The 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act gives rules on
using secret information at trial, but trials must remain open.
Similarly important is information that is non-classified, but of
great interest to terrorists, if published for example over the
Internet-an example might be the capture of a terrorist
procedures manual, public knowledge of the capture of which
would then allow terrorist groups to make adjustments.
Another example might be the publication, as took place in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, of extensive engineering
data on the construction of the towers; such information is
public but not easy to obtain, unless, for example, it is brought
into open court in a trial. The third reason is the long-term
protection of participants, in a setting in which, because the
perpetrators are driven by ideology rather than money,
revenge may be considered a sacred, and hence permanent,
obligation.
B. Criminals and Enemies
These specifics refer back to a basic conceptual problem. The
perpetrators of September 11 and other terrorist attacks are not
morally and legally analogous to the perpetrators of domestic
crime in a settled domestic society. For some, to be sure, such
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as former Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of State
of Human Rights and Yale Law School professor Harold
Hongju Koh, they are similar and provide an opportunity to:
[p]romote values that must stand higher than vengeance: to
hold them accountable for their crimes against humanity, to
tell the world the true facts of those crimes and to
demonstrate that civilized societies can provide justice for
even the most heinous outlaws.
38
This approach is seriously mistaken. The ability to prosecute
domestic crime, and the necessity of providing constitutional
standards of due process, including the extraordinarily
complex rules of evidence, suppression of evidence, right to
counsel, and the rights against self-incrimination have
developed within a particular political community, and
fundamentally reflect decisions about rights within a
fundamentally domestic, democratic setting in which all of us
have a stake in both sides of the equation, as prosecutors and
prosecuted, because we are part of the political community
which must consider both individual rights and collective
security.
It is a system, in other words, that fundamentally treats
crime as a deviation from the domestic legal order, not
fundamentally an attack upon the very basis of that order.
Terrorists who come from outside this society, including those
who take up residence inside this society for the purpose of
destroying it, cannot be assimilated into the structure of the
ordinary criminal trial. True enough, citizenship alone is
enough to qualify a person to be tried for attacks upon that
order, as in the case of a domestic terrorist such as Timothy
McVeigh. But, in fact, the domestic legal system strains to
acknowledge the awfulness of what someone like McVeigh has
done: his crimes are not reducible to so many murders, so many
injured victims, so much destruction of property, and so on in
the way one thinks of ordinary criminals. The actual charges
available to prosecutors in his trial, and hence the conduct of
the trial itself, in a curious but profound way, missed the point
of his act, which was not merely to murder people, but to make
war upon the United States. McVeigh, like bin Laden and Al
38. Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for bin Laden, N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 2001, at A33.
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Qaeda, undertook not a deviation from the domestic order, but
an attack upon it.39 McVeigh's membership in the political
community through citizenship was enough to grant him trial
as though his acts were merely crimes and not attacks, but the
moral reality is that McVeigh had transformed himself into a
true outsider, not merely a deviant. He was not merely a
criminal, but also an enemy. Al Qaeda has the same status-but
the U.S. district courts are, by constitutional design, for
criminals and not for those who are at once criminals and
enemies. U.S. district courts are eminently unsuited by
practicality but also by concept for the task of addressing those
who planned and executed September 11.
IV. M!IITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Constitutional Questions
The fundamental problem, of course, is that while it is easy
to accept the distinction between domestic criminals, deviating
from the domestic order, on the one hand, and those who are at
once criminals and enemies of it, on the other, the question
remains who shall make that essential determination in any
particular case. I do not propose to critique the elements of the
Military Order with regard to its various pronouncements on
substantive law, procedure, and jurisdiction. Nor does this
discussion take up the problem of separation of powers and the
role of Congress, if any. The Military Order is deeply flawed in
many of these matters, and I leave it to others to detail its
problems. It is more useful instead to set out markers of what is
constitutionally defensible, in conceptual terms.
First, the U.S. Constitution is not a document for the entire
world. It is not a pact with the world, or a pact among people
generally in the world. It is a document as among the members
of a particular political community, and its burdens and
39. Moralists since the Holocaust and Nuremberg trials have oscillated on how
to see the crimes and perpetrators at issue. There is a natural desire to scale down
the "grandness" of the evil-thus Hannah Arendt's famous description of the
"banality of evil," for example, or Albert Camus, in The Rebel, using the image of
gangsters, and declaring that: "Deprived of the morality of Goethe, Germany
chose, and submitted to, the ethics of the gang.... Gangster morality is an
inexhaustible round of triumph and revenge, defeat and resentment." ALBERT
CAMUS, THE REBEL, 150 (Anthony Bower trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1954) (1951).
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benefits accrue to them. Particularly those in the international
human rights community who now complain that the United
States does not propose to extend full constitutional protections
to categories of non-U.S. citizens on the ground that these
protections are somehow required by notions of universal
justice and due process seem to forget that this same human
rights community has been careful to construct international
tribunals, such as the Yugoslavia tribunal, which make no
pretense of adhering to America's far more rigorous notions of
procedure, due process, and evidentiary rules. Even in
substantive law, too, the international human rights
community has been more than happy to accept international
standards on such things as incitement to racial hatred and
hate speech that would clearly violate the First Amendment, on
the ground that the U.S. Constitution does not and need not
apply. Human rights activists cannot have it both ways.
Second, the fundamental parameters of the United States
political community are twofold: citizenship and territory. The
case for full U.S. constitutional protection is strongest when
dealing with U.S. citizens on the territory of the United States-
even including McVeigh-while the weakest case is a non-U.S.
citizen on foreign territory, such as non-citizen Al Qaeda
suspects captured in Afghanistan. Even the McVeighs deserve
U.S. constitutional protections in regular U.S. courts (and have
received them), while aliens abroad have not: this is all
ordinary jurisprudence, and is reflected in the Military Order
insofar as only (certain) aliens may be tried by military
commission. The questions arise in the mixed cases.
Third, in my understanding, permanent residents of the
United States, like citizens, are accorded full constitutional
protection. This view is at odds with the Military Order,
however, which fails to treat alien permanent residency as a
separate and protected category of non-citizen. Federal courts,
however, have and, in my estimation, would continue to read
the language of the Sixth Amendment, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury," for example, as applicable to
permanent residents. Quoting Harvard Law School professor
Laurence Tribe, "[N]ot even Congress could empower a
president to subject any resident alien to trial by tribunal
whenever the president claims reason to believe that the
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accused ever aided or abetted what the -president deems
international terrorism." 0
Fourth, in my view, territoriality ought to be decisive in the
case of nonresident aliens lawfully on the territory of the United
States. For example, alien students present on student visas for
legitimate reasons would not be subject to military
commissions, on the simple but intuitively persuasive ground
that military commissions, as so many commentators have
pointed out, are constitutionally dangerous creatures and that
territoriality is one way of limiting the damage they can do. On
the other hand, someone who entered the United States on
allegedly valid papers, such as a student visa, but with the
intent of committing terrorism, would not be present
"lawfully" in the United States, and so would be subject to a
military tribunal. On the other hand, a permanent resident who
had entered the country lawfully, perhaps many years before,
and who, for example, underwent a conversion to doctrines of
terrorism, ought not to be subject to military commission.
Neither of these situations, however, is consistent with the
Military Order, which makes no such distinctions. On the other
hand, White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, in what amounts
to a reversal of portions of the Military Order and not merely
an interpretation of them-has stated that an individual
"arrested, detained, or tried in the United States" by military
commission will be able to "challenge the lawfulness of the
commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus proceeding
in a federal court."' Habeas can serve as the protection for
those nonresident aliens with facially valid papers, present in
the United States, but accused of terrorist intentions.
B. International Law and Military Commissions
If these basic markers of constitutionally acceptable
jurisdiction of military commissions are provisionally accepted,
so that persons who fall under the jurisdiction are
acknowledged not to benefit from U.S. constitutional
protection, then the question is to what procedural and due
process protections they are entitled under international law. In
40. Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, Military Tribunals: Too Broad a Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2001, at A28.
41. Gonzales, supra note 5, at A25.
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the circumstances of armed conflict in which the United States
is now embroiled, the applicable law is international
humanitarian law. It is worth beginning with the observation
that international humanitarian law applies when the facts
indicate that an armed conflict is underway, as is now the case
for the United States. It is not necessarily the case that at some
point in the future the United States would continue to be at
war in the actual sense of armed conflict, the actual conduct of
hostilities, as distinguished from "war" in a metaphorical
sense, such as the "war on drugs." The reason this distinction
of actual armed conflict is relevant is that a different set of
international laws might then apply outside the context of
actual armed conflict, rather than international humanitarian
law, including such agreements as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
In the present situation of armed conflict, however, the
applicable laws are the Geneva Conventions, on the one hand,
and customary international law, the so-called "laws and
customs of war," on the other.42 The Third Geneva Convention
covers the treatment of prisoners of war (POW), including the
definition of who constitutes a bona fide POW and procedures
for criminal proceedings against POWs.43
It provides at Article 4 a definition of a lawful combatant,
who thus benefits from the so-called "combatant's privilege",
which provides: first, immunity from prosecution for such acts
as killings and destruction that would, under other
circumstances, be considered criminal acts, provided that they
are carried out under the requirements of the laws of war;
second, the privilege of surrender and quarter; and, third, the
right to be treated as a POW in case of capture by the enemy.
Article 4 provides, in part, that POW's include persons "who
having fallen into the hands of the enemy," as:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied,
provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including
42. Theodor Meron, Customary Law, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC
SHOULD KNOW 113 (Roy Gutman and David Rieff eds., 1999).
43. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
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such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions: that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; that of having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; that of carrying
arms openly; that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. 4
Protocol I also provides rules about the definition of a
combatant entitled to POW treatment; Article 44(3) states in
part:
[A combatant] shall retain his status as a combatant,
provided that.., he carries his arms openly: (a) during each
military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is to participate.45
The United States, however, has never accepted this
extended definition of a combatant in Protocol I, on the
grounds that it lessens, rather than increases, protections for
the civilian population. It has specifically named this article of
Protocol I as a reason why it refuses to ratify Protocol I, and it
will not be bound by it in the current circumstances.
The point, however, is that the terrorists and organization
which planned and executed the September 11, attacks do not
fit the definition of combatants entitled to receive POW
benefits. Apart from the requirements of carrying arms openly
and bearing a fixed distinctive sign visible at a distance, and
apart from any theoretical controversy over the extended
definition of a combatant under Protocol I not accepted by the
United States, it is patently clear that the September 11
terrorists fail the requirement of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. They failed this
requirement, of course, by using civilians as both the means
and targets of their attacks, among other things.
What is the consequence of failing to qualify as a POW? It is
not that a POW i entirely immune from prosecution. POW's
are liable to prosecution, including by the forces holding them,
for violations of the'laws and customs of war-war crimes and
44. Id., art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d), 6 US.T at 3320,75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
45. Protocol I: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1977)
art. 44(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, a
national of a "party to a conflict" who is captured by his own
sovereign government-a rebel fighter in a civil war captured
by government forces, or even more to the point, an American
citizen such as John Philip Walker Lindh, a Taliban fighter
captured while engaged in combat against U.S. forces 46-is
liable to prosecution for treason, murder, and other national
laws by his own government. The significance is that a POW
may only be tried according to the rules laid out in the Third
Geneva Convention, which provide for basic due process.
Those rules, found at Articles 99-108 of the Third Geneva
Convention, do not provide for extensive due process on their
own.4 7 They do provide, however, that a POW must be given
essentially the same rights that as a member of the armed
forces of the party trying him or her would receive under
similar circumstances:
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the
sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according
to the same procedure as in the case of members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore,
the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed.8
The provision means that if a member of Al Qaeda or some
other accused terrorist was determined to be a bona fide POW,
then the procedures required to try him would be those under
which an equivalent U.S. serviceman or woman would be tried.
Those procedures would be under the United States Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which in nearly every respect
provides for the same constitutional rights for military
personnel tried under courts-martial that a civilian would have
in civilian courts. This reference would, in large part, of course,
defeat the purpose of the Military Order, which seeks to
provide military trials, but specifically not under the elaborate
and extensive procedural rules of the UCMJ and its full
constitutional protections.
If a person accused of terrorist activity does not, however,
46. See Dexter Filkins, With the Military Present, Red Cross Officials Talk to
Captured U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at B2.
47. The rules do, however, provide more extensive procedures in capital trials,
and specifically provide that six months shall go by after giving a POW notice of
sentence before a sentence of death may be carried out. See Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 43, art. 101, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75 U.N.T.S. at 212.
48. Id. art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75 U.N.T.S. at 212.
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meet the requirements of the Third Geneva Convention as a
POW, does he then benefit' from any protection under
international humanitarian law? Such people would be
counted, at that point, as what the Bush Administration has
declared them to be, "unqualified belligerents" or "unqualified
combatants" - combatants who do not meet the legal
requirements to be POW's and hence are liable to prosecution
under national and international law for any belligerent actions
they may have participated or conspired in. They are to be
fought militarily as unqualified combatants, but if captured,
treated as criminals.
Although unqualified belligerents benefit in international
humanitarian law from some minimal procedural and due
process protections, not even unqualified belligerents, spies, or
civilian saboteurs may be dealt with summarily-that is,
without benefit of a hearing to determine their status and fate.
Article 75 of Protocol I lays out a roadmap to minimal
procedural fairness accorded to such persons, and it states in
part:
No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed
on a person found guilty of a penal offense related to the
armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced
by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting
the generally principles of regular judicial procedures .... 49
It may be argued that the military commissions established
in the Military Order do not constitute a "regularly constituted
court," operating with "regular judicial procedures."
Moreover, the Commission may not be viewed as "impartial."
To this claim it might be tempting for the United States
government to reply that it has never ratified Protocol I, from
which this language is drawn. This response would be a
mistake because the United States has an interest in ensuring
that its soldiers, civilian operatives such as CIA agents, and so
on, are not subjected to summary procedures in other
circumstances. The procedures in Article 75 of Protocol I are so
minimal that the United States would not be likely to have a
problem acknowledging them as a restatement of customary
international law.
It would be more correct for the United States to explicitly
49. Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 75(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38.
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frame its military commissions as compliant with Article 75 of
Protocol I and to assert that they are regularly constituted
courts, with regular judicial procedures, operating in an
impartial manner. It is in this context that the history of
military commissions convened by U.S. armed forces in
conflicts from the Civil War to World War II becomes
relevant-as evidence of practice which has been accepted by
both U.S. civilian courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, as
well as by other armed forces such as the World War II allies.
It is worth noting what is not required by Article 75 (although
it specifically reserves any other protection which a person
might benefit from under any other law or provision). It does
require that a person charged with an offense is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. The Military Order is grievously
wrong in this regard.,50 Moreover, Article 78 does provide for
notice, a right to be heard, conviction only for personal penal
responsibility rather than collective punishment, the right to be
present in the hearing, the right to examine witnesses against
one and put on one's own witnesses under the same
circumstances as witnesses against one, for public
pronouncement of the judgment, and the right to be advised of
post conviction remedies.5' Further, Article 75 prohibits
prosecutions for ex post facto crimes.5 2 But Article 75 does not
mention a right to counsel, let alone a right to the counsel of
one's choice. It does not provide for a public trial; only that it is
a right of the convicted to have the judgment pronounced
publicly. Nor does it provide for judicial review either by
higher military or civilian authorities. It does not require any
special procedures for reaching a capital verdict.
Article 75 of Protocol I is thus nearly void of procedural
protections, yet it is the minimum due process required by
international humanitarian law for persons, such as
unprivileged combatants, who do not benefit from other
protections of law. It is frankly far below what the United
States has announced will be the procedural protections of the
military commissions. Those protections ought to be far higher
than announced in the Military Order, but the point is that the
50. Id. art. 75(4)(d), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38.
51. Id. art 75(4) (a)-(j), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38.
52 Id.
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United States can and should frame these military commissions
as consistent with international humanitarian law in this time
of actual hostilities.
The final question, however, with respect to international
humanitarian law, is who has the power to determine whether
a person is an unprivileged combatant subject to Article 75 of
Protocol I or is instead a POW who benefits from the Third
Geneva Convention. The United States, thus far, appears to
have taken the position that those persons involved in the
September 11 attacks are, by definition, unprivileged
combatants because of the nature of the attacks themselves and
their violation of the laws and customs of war, and that this
determination can be made under the power of the commander
in chief. The Bush Administration has accepted, in addition, at
least according to the White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales,
a right of habeas corpus to determine jurisdiction and status for
persons "arrested, detained, or tried in the United States" by
military commission that would otherwise make a final
determination of the question of POW status.53
With respect to those who would not benefit from a writ of
habeas corpus presented to civilian federal courts, because the
person is a non-citizen arrested, detained, or tried outside the
United States, neither the Third Geneva Convention nor Article
75 addresses the matter directly. The relevant article of the
Third Geneva Convention provides, at Article 5:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands
of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4 [defining POW's], such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal.M
The question is whether a military commission can be
considered a "competent tribunal" (and in particular for
persons who do not have other procedural avenues such as
habeas corpus). In my opinion, a military commission can meet
the requirements of a "competent tribunal" if it is within the
requirements of Article 75, specifically, a regularly constituted
court with regular judicial procedures and impartiality. It need
53. Gonzales, supra note 5, at A25 (emphasis added).
54. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3364, 3394, 75
U.N.T.S. at 142,212.
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not be a court martial under the Third Geneva Convention
rules applicable to bona fide POW's. If this were not the case,
the truncated due process requirements of Article 75 would
mean very little, because every attempt to proceed under the
minimal requirements of Article 75 would result in recourse to
a regular POW court martial under Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention in order to determine an individual's
status.
It is theoretically possible, one supposes, that recourse to full
POW court martial proceedings in every case was the intent of
the Article 75(8) provision stating that: "No provision of this
Article [75] may be construed as limiting or infringing any
other more favorable provision granting greater protection,
under any applicable rules of international law, to persons
covered by paragraph 1."5 Such an interpretation, however, is
untenable under any plausible construction. Since the "persons
covered by paragraph 1" are declared to be those who are not
covered by any "more favorable treatment under the [Geneva]
Convention or under this Protocol [I], "56 then the persons
referred to in Article 75(8) are not, by definition, POW's,
because if they were, they would not be "covered by paragraph
1." If they are not POW's, then they are entitled only to a
competent tribunal which, if Article 75 is to mean anything less
than the full procedures required under the Third Geneva
Convention, leads to the conclusion that a court legally
convened under the lesser standards of Article 75 ought to be
able to make a determination as to whether the accused is in
fact a POW or unprivileged combatant. Nevertheless, it should
be plainly stated that the Military Order departs from the
concept of justice by not providing for a review even by other
military judges. Appeal to a military appeals panel providing
finality that could review the question of status would remove
any doubt as to whether the requirements of Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention or Article 75 of Protocol I had been
met. Moreover, it is a desirable thing from the standpoint of
military justice itself, even within the strictures of military
commissions.
55. Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 75(8), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38.
56. Id. art 75(1), at 37.
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V. THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY
NAVAL BASE, CUBA
Since the writing of the main body of this Article in
December 2001, the primary focus of debate and controversy
over the application of the laws of war in the war on terrorism
has been the treatment and legal status of battlefield detainees
taken into the custody of the United States in the course of
hostilities in Afghanistan and now transferred, or slated to be
transferred, to a detention center at the United States military
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As of this writing, on January
30, 2002, 158 detainees transferred from Afghanistan are being
held at Guantanamo Bay; the New York Times reports that
there are citizens of at least twenty-five countries among the
detainees, including Britain, Australia, France, Belgium,
Sweden, Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia.57 The United States had announced plans to bring
hundreds more for an undetermined period of detention and
final fate,58 and has been in the process of constructing
permanent facilities for 1,000 or more detainees.
59
Complaints of inhumane treatment of the detainees has been
vociferous, especially from European governments and
international human rights activists, and especially so
following the publication of photographs showing prisoners
arriving from Afghanistan, -"[s]hackled and blinded by
blacked-out goggles." 60 Amnesty International, for example, is
reported as describing this arrival treatment as "classic
techniques employed to 'break' the spirit of individuals ahead
of interrogation." It and Human Rights Watch have further
claimed that the open-walled pens in which the men are held
57. Katharine Q. Seelye & David E. Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand on Treating
Captives of War: He Rejects P.O. W. Status, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al.
58. See Jess Bravin, et al, Status of Guantanamo Bay Detainees Is Focus of Bush
Security Team's Meeting, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A16 ("the 158 men
imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and the hundreds more expected
to join them.").
59. See Jess Bravin, U.S. Dismisses Queries About Cuba Detainees, WALL ST. J., Jan.
23, 2002, at B12 ("Around the clock, Navy Seabees are building more cages, guard
towers and other facilities to expand Camp X-Ray. Later, the camp will be
replaced by a 'more permanent' prison designed for 1,000 inmates, said Marine
Brig. Gen. Michael R. Lehnert.").
60. Id.
61. Id.
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violate provisions of the Geneva Conventions requiring that
prisoner facilities shall "be entirely protected from the
dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular
between dusk and lights out."62 In Britain, the Mail on Sunday
newspaper headlined a photograph of the shackled and
goggled prisoners "Tortured," while The Mirror headlined the
same photograph with, "What the hell are you doing in our
name Mr. Blair?" 63 London's Daily Mail opined that America
was in the grip of a "revenge lust that has swept away normal
moral concerns." 64 Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, has
"called for the British suspects to be sent home for trial," 65
although, as of this writing, Prime Minister Tony Blair's has
noted that the "three British prisoners at the detention center,
called Camp X-Ray, 'had no complaints about their
treatment.'"66
Notwithstanding the shrillness of the criticism, there appears
to be little if any substance to the complaints about treatment of
the detainees. The detainees, according to all the accounts of
journalists and visitors to the camp of which I am aware,
including a U.S. congressional delegation,67 are receiving a
quality of care, in the way of housing, food, medical attention,
and religious requirements, that far exceeds the standard of the
Third Geneva Convention, even assuming that it applied. As a
British journalist who visited the Guantanamo facility has said,
"There are 161 medical staff treating the [158] detainees. I have
talked to surgeons who told me that hardened fighters
suffering from shrapnel and bullet wounds had thanked them
after being operated on."
68
As for the allegations of torture and mistreatment so freely
tossed about by European news media and international
62. Katherine Q. Seelye, On Defensive, General Says Prisoners Get Mats, Even
Bagels, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A14.
63. Toby Harnden, X-Ray, From Close Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at A18.
64. Katharine Q. Seelye, Criticized, U.S. Brings Visitors to Prison Camp, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A6 (citation omitted).
65. Id.
66. Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Defends Treatment by U.S. of Cuba Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at Al.
67. See, e.g., John Mintz, Delegations Praise Detainees' Treatment, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 2002, at A15 ("Two congressional delegations that toured the prison camp
... yesterday said they saw no evidence the prisoners are being mistreated.").
68. Toby Harnden, X-Ray, From Close Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at A18
(Washington bureau chief of the Daily Telegraph (London)).
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human rights organizations such as Amnesty International,
even if, as they claim, the Third Geneva Convention applied to
these detainees, its provision would not invalidate the security
procedures that the United States has used with respect to
these men. They are, after all, precisely what the United States
has said they are-hardened, tough fighters who pose an
extraordinary threat not only to the United States but to the
men and women guarding them. The "detaining power," in the
language of the Third Geneva Convention, even if it does
apply, has full rights to use sensible security precautions,
particularly with prisoners who have, in some cases, already
abused their status as detainees. These detainees may include,
after all, some of those who surrendered falsely in Afghanistan,
only to begin fighting again, with the resulting death of CIA
officer Johnny Spann.69 Human rights organizations, such as
Amnesty International, might reflect on the fact that abuse of
the privilege of surrender, perfidious surrender, is itself a
separate and distinct war crime, and that where a "detaining
power" deals with prisoners among whom are likely to be
those who have already shown a propensity for violating the
privilege of surrender, it is entitled to use such measures as
shackles and hoods.
70
The core of the issue of treatment, therefore, comes down to
two questions. The first is the question of interrogation of the
prisoners. The second is how long the United States might hold
them, and whether it has any legal obligations, either under
international law or U.S. law, to bring charges or release them.
With respect to the first question, interrogation, the United
States has been adamant that it will interrogate the detainees
relentlessly in order to obtain information that might help it
avert future attacks on the United States.71 Congressional
visitors to Guantanamo have reported, for example, that
interrogations "have yielded valuable intelligence on al
69. See, e.g., Prisoners of Politics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2002, at A18 (liberal critics
who have "leapt to denounce conditions in Cuba for the killers of CIA agent
Johnny Spann.").
70. See, e.g., David Rhode, Perfidy and Treachery, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 270-71 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).
71. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye & David E. Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand of
Treating Captives of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al ("The administration...
wants the freedom to question.").
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Qaeda."72 It is true that detainees who are classified as POW's
under the Third Geneva Convention are more greatly protected
from interrogation than those who are not; specifically, they
may not be punished for refusing to reveal anything other than
the classic "name, rank, and serial number." However, contrary
to the impressions of some of the Bush Administration's critics,
this does not mean that the "detaining power" may not ask any
questions it likes. On the contrary, it may ask away; but it
simply may not punish for failure to answer. The Third Geneva
Convention under Article 17 is sweeping in its protection of
POW's, but it does not preclude questioning as such:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from
them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
expo~d to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.
Moreover, even under the Third Geneva Convention, POW's
may be rewarded if they do answer. In the end, there is
considerable significance with respect to interrogation attached
to being a bona fide POW, but less than some might think.
After all, whether or not the detainees are treated as POW's,
they may not be physically abused in the course of
interrogation. Neither may they be psychologically abused,
whether by reference to the detailed requirements of Article 17
or on some broader standard of human rights, although the
standard for determining what constitutes non-physical abuse
of detainees, whether POW's or otherwise, is inherently more
ambiguous, and often will reside in a gray area that coincides
with what are defensible security precautions, such as shackles.
Moreover, the rights groups so solicitous for the rights of the
Guantanamo detainees ought to consider that the
interrogations are not merely in pursuit of strategic goals of
warfare; they are also in pursuit of alleged war criminals in
respect of past actions and, quite possibly, future ones.
International human rights monitors are fond of announcing
the universal international law obligation to pursue allegations
72. John Mintz, Delegations Praise Detainees' Treatment, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,
2002, at A15.
73. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 17, 6 U.S.T. at 3330, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 148.
[Vol. 25
No. 2] A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions 625
of war crimes under all circumstances. Why should that
obligation be any less just because the beneficiaries of success
in tracking down perpetrators of past acts and conspirators
towards future ones are likely to be Americans?
A much more serious issue is the question of how long
detention might run. Here too, however, the issue of whether a
detainee is a POW under the Third Geneva Convention is
important but not the only consideration. It is true that bona
fide POW's must be repatriated at the "cessation of active
hostilities" (although prisoners serving sentences validly
pronounced for war crimes or other crimes may be compelled
to serve them).74 However, even if the detainees were not
covered by the Third Geneva Convention, a person may not be
held forever without charges or trial. At some point, in some
manner, whether through the vehicle of the international law of
war or some other avenue, the question of indefinite and
possibly permanent detention without trial must eventually
arise.
That having been said, even if the Third Geneva Convention
applied, at least at this moment, active hostilities in
Afghanistan continue. Detention and internment, even of
civilians and non-combatants, let alone combatants, under the
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are quite acceptable, so
long as certain procedures for their protection are in place. Not
only fighters, but under certain criteria, even non-combatant
civilians may be deemed a security risk and interned; there are
limits to this power, but the Fourth Geneva Convention grants
a certain level of discretion to the security needs of a party to a
conflict. Moreover, one could argue-decisively, in my view-
that as long as operations are being carried out against Al
Qaeda, the organization whose destruction is one of the war
aims of the United States, the United States is perfectly entitled
under the Third Geneva Convention to detain fighters whom it
determines to be a security risk in connection with that
organization, not merely in Afghanistan, but elsewhere. The
theater of war is wider than Afghanistan. It probably could not
do so with respect to an endless and essentially metaphorical
"war on terrorism" dealing with targets wholly unrelated to Al
74. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 43, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75
U.N.T.S. at 224.
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Qaeda-a war which might indeed have no end-but it is
certainly entitled to do so with fighters or civilians connected
even loosely with Al Qaeda, wherever they may be. Absent the
application of the Third Geneva Convention, the United States,
while it must eventually bring charges and have some kind of
trial, even if only a military tribunal as discussed above, has
considerable latitude in the timing and preparation of those
trials. They need not happen on a timetable to suit Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, or the governments of the
European Union.
Ultimately, of course, the outcomes of many of the issues
raised above hinge largely, although not completely, on
whether a detainee is regarded as a bona fide POW under the
Third Geneva Convention or not. Three positions have
emerged on this issue. First, the Bush Administration has
asserted strongly that the detainees are not entitled to any
application of the Third Geneva Convention, not even to
determine their status as POW's or, instead, as unlawful
combatants, as discussed above. This Article has already
discussed, in connection with military tribunals, the
requirements to be a POW under the Third Geneva
Convention. The point made by the Bush Administration is
that Al Qaeda is not a military force at all, even if the forces
that seeking to destroy it are U.S. military forces. It is instead,
in this view, a criminal organization pure and simple, and its
fighters are not legal combatants, nor are they entitled to a
determination under the Third Geneva Convention to ascertain
whether they are.75 To give them that status would be the same
as saying that an international drug trafficker picked up, for
example, in international waters by the U.S. Navy would be
entitled to a hearing under the Third Geneva Convention to
determine whether he or she was a POW, merely on account of
the fact that those picking him or her up were military engaged
in a military operation.
Although this position has been defended generally on
grounds that the Geneva Conventions are simply inapplicable
75. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye & David E. Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand of
Treating Captives of War, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al. ("The administration has
contended that the captives are terrorists, not conventional soldiers in a
conventional war, and that they are therefore not deserving of the protections of
the Geneva rules.").
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to criminal terrorists, it is worth noting that a principled
argument to the same end can be made on the basis of the
Third Geneva Convention itself. Critics of the Bush
Administration's position have focused, logically enough, on
the language of Article 5 which provides that in cases of doubt,
the matter shall be resolved by a "competent tribunal." I have
argued supra that a competent tribunal may perfectly well be a
military commission operating in conformity with Article 75 of
Protocol I insofar as it embodies customary international law,
rather than either civilian courts or a regular court martial. The
text of Article 5, however, states a threshold before anything
need be resolved by a "competent tribunal"; namely, a
competent tribunal is required only "should any doubt arise"
with respect to the status of detainees. Article 5 contains no
requirement whatsoever that the question of whether there is
any doubt must itself be a question for a "competent tribunal"
versus a determination by military authorities as such. Thus,
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld could and has asserted that
there is no doubt as to their status-" [t]here is no ambiguity in
this case" 76 -and hence no requirement to hold a tribunal.
Despite the fact that one recoils at the implication that, in
theory at least, every drug operation conducted by the U.S.
military might require some kind of tribunal to determine
POW status, and despite the fact that a principled argument
can be made from the text of the Third Geneva Convention
itself in Article 5, the Bush Administration's position is
ultimately not persuasive. It is not persuasive principally for
the reason that irrespective of such niceties as declaring war, by
any understanding of the international law of war, the United
States has and continues to be engaged in armed conflict. It is
using its full military machinery to wage war. After all, what
distinguishes the Bush strategy against terrorism from the
Clinton-era strategy of law enforcement? It is emphatically not
that law enforcement activities are being "supported" by
military action. The United States went down that path, to its
sorrow, in Somalia in 1993.' The fundamental difference
between the current war and law enforcement is not the
76. Katharine Q. Seeyle, Detainees Are Not P.O. W 's, Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,2002, at A6.
77. See MARK BOWDEN, BLAcKHAwK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR (1999).
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participation of U.S. military acting as a posse sent out to arrest
the bad guys. It is, rather, that Bush announced that the United
States would not distinguish between terrorists and states that
harbor them, and would bring down either as necessary.78
Announcing aims that deliberately link non-state actors and
states means, if you use the weapons of modem war, that
politically, morally, and legally, you are at war. In this instance,
then, Human Rights Watch is correct in its assessment:
The United States government could have pursued terrorist
suspects by traditional law-enforcement means, in which
case the Geneva Conventions would not apply... But since
the United States government engaged in armed conflict in
Afghanistan-by bombing and undertaking other military
operations-the Geneva Conventions clearly do apply to
that conflict."
79
The second position is that espoused at least occasionally by
Amnesty International officials and a handful of other
commentators. According to the Washington Post, although
"Amnesty International has not taken a formal stand on the
POW question.., officials with the human rights group say
they believe Al Qaeda fighters qualify as POW's because they
were at the time intermingled with regular Taliban forces in
Afghanistan." 80 The argument appears to be that by being
"intermingled" with regular Taliban fighters, Al Qaeda fighters
were somehow assimilated into Taliban command structure
and so (presuming that Taliban fighters are entitled to regular
POW status) they overcame the problem of Al Qaeda not
adhering to the laws of war by being part of an organization
that (presumably) did, at least enough for its fighters to qualify
as legal combatants.
This second position appears dubious at best. It is not in the
least bit obvious that by being an Al Qaeda fighter, someone
who has come typically from outside Afghanistan to train and
fight, becomes "part" of a "legal" organization by
78. See Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the United States and the
American, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
79. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, to
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser (Jan. 28, 2002), quoted in Katharine Q.
Seelye, A P.O. W. Tangle: What the Law Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A14.
80. John Mintz, On Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary, WASH. POST, Jan. 27,
2002, at A22.
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intermingling with them. The issue is command and control. It
is simply a fact of international law that one's status as a legal
or illegal combatant under the Third Geneva Convention
depends in part on the nature of the organization for which one
fights. If the organization collectively fails the test of the Third
Geneva Convention, its fighters individually are not POW's,
irrespective of whether they have individually committed war
crimes or not: This is the meaning of Article 4(a)(2)(d) of the
Third Geneva Convention requiring that those who are not
members of "regular" armed forces be part of an organization
capable of adhering to the laws of war.81 Al Qaeda plainly does
not meet that test. Whether the Taliban meet that test is an open
question, given that the Taliban was recognized as a
government by no more than three states in the world and that
it came to power through civil war that did not necessarily
convey any status of a successor state. Even if the Taliban did
meet that standard, however, merely being with them does not
constitute being part of them in the relevant sense of command
and control. On the contrary, it is far easier to argue that
whatever legal status the Taliban enjoyed was instead vitiated
by the incorporation of obviously illegal combatants into its
ranks. It is far more persuasive to think that the Taliban
weakened the claim of its fighters to POW status by fighting
with Al Qaeda than that Al Qaeda fighters strengthened their
claims by fighting with the Taliban.
The third, and most persuasive position, is that currently
being enunciated by the U.S. State Department in discussions
within the Bush Administration taking place. 82 Under this
view, the detainees are covered by the Third Geneva
Convention in the sense that they are entitled individually to a
hearing by a "competent tribunal" to determine their status as
either bona fide POW's or else unlawful combatants. The
question of their status, however, is determined by their
membership or participation in an organization, Al Qaeda, that
does not meet the requirements of the Third Geneva
81. Of course, they can only be held individually criminally liable for their own
individual actions, including actions as conspirators, but the procedures under
which they can be tried-full Third Geneva Convention POW procedures or
truncated Article 75 procedures-will be determined by the nature of the
organization for which they fought.
82. See, e.g., Seelye & Sanger, supra note 75, at Al.
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Convention. The sole issue for a tribunal is to determine their
connection to organizations not meeting those requirements
(and, significantly, whether they fought for some organization
that met the requirements-fighting "solo," so to speak, also
flunks the Third Geneva Convention tests). If they cross that
threshold, they are treated as POW's, and if not, they are illegal
combatants. At some point, even as illegal combatants, they
must be charged and tried, but they would receive no greater
protections than the customary law provisions already outlined
under the discussion of Article 75 of Protocol I.
The question then remains of what constitutes a "competent
tribunal" within the meaning of the Third Geneva Convention.
At that point, the legal analysis re-joins that already discussed
with respect to military commissions. A competent tribunal
need not be a tribunal convened with full POW protections
under the Third Geneva Convention. The argument that
providing provisional POW protections to a detainee in respect
of treatment further means that a "competent tribunal" must
also be a court martial under the Third Geneva Convention
itself fatally ignores the specific provisions of Article 75,
which-drafted some thirty years after the 1949 Conventions
and fully cognizant of them- affirmatively establish a lower
standard of process. To require that every hearing be under the
Third Geneva Convention POW standard would render
pointless the lesser procedures specifically established under
Article 75 and customary law for dealing with those accused of
abusing their civilian status, such as spies, saboteurs, and other
illegal combatants. Rather, all that is required is what has
already been stated under Article 75. It is a procedure which
does not require an open trial, does not require counsel, and
does not even require an appeals process although, as earlier
stated, I believe the United States ought to provide for one.
In my view, the best way for the United States to proceed
with the detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base would be
under the terms of its own regulations dating from 1997 and
contemplating exactly this situation. 3 The determination of
POW or illegal combatant status should be done by a three
83. See ARMY PUBLICATIONS AND PRINTING COMMAND, ENEMY PRISONERS OF
WAR, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § 3 (1997), http://books.
usapa.belvoir.army.mil/cgi-bin/bookmgr/BOOKS/JI31304/ CCONTENTS.
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officer tribunal, using a majority vote, and a standard of the
preponderance of the evidence.
What kind of evidence should a panel consider, given that Al
Qaeda is not an organization handing out membership cards?
Among the factors to be considered ordinarily dispositive with
respect to the fighters taken from Afghanistan to Guantanamo
would at least figure whether the fighter had trained in Al
Qaeda camps. Similarly ordinarily dispositive ought to be
nationality; although there may well be Afghan Al Qaeda,
foreigners fighting in Afghanistan should be regarded as Al
Qaeda. Such tribunals could be convened quickly and
efficiently. If conjoined with a limited appeals process made
solely to a military tribunal (but during which time the United
States would be free to treat the detainee as an illegal
combatant subject to reversal by the appellate panel), the
interests of a fair procedure under international law and the
pursuit of illegal combatants could both be accommodated.
Some level of infra-military appeals process also has the
important political virtue of allowing a quick initial panel with
an appeals panel (no counsel at any level, consistent with
Article 75) that can consider appeals more slowly while still
treating the detainees as formally adjudged illegal combatants.
The political risk of not having an appeals process is that any
initial trial panel would inevitably be denounced as a kangaroo
court, and in order to respond to criticism-especially coming
from so many erstwhile "allies" with nationals in custody-the
Bush Administration would inevitably slow down the process
and complicate the procedure. Better instead to have an
appeals process, strictly within the military. Beyond that, it
should ignore the shrill voices of those whose policy amounts
to a tender solicitude for the alleged rights of anyone, just so
long as they are not American.
VI. CONCLUSION
Nevertheless, a serious moral lacuna remains. The Military
Order provides for trial by military commission on charges of
"violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws."8
4
White House counsel Gonzales says that those tried "must be
chargeable with offenses against the international laws of war,
84. Military Order, supra note 1, § 1(e).
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like targeting civilians or hiding in civilian populations and
refusing to bear arms openly.""5 The same substantive terms
would apply to an international tribunal or to a U.S. district
court trial. Yet it somehow misses the point.
If we were to elaborate the crimes with which the
perpetrators of September 11 should be charged in any of these
fora, we would include murder, conspiracy to murder,
destruction of property, and others Under international
humanitarian law, they could also be charged with violations
of the laws and customs of war, including the targeting of
civilians and using prohibited means and methods of attack.
Others would even add a charge for crimes against humanity.
Yet, this does not quite satisfy us, because beyond the methods
of warfare, in the traditional sense of jus in bello, we Americans
also want to punish them, in a categorical, not narrowly legal,
sense, for their aggression against the United States. We want
retribution not just for crimes against individuals, but for
aggression against the United States of America.
Liberal internationalists, it is true, have an easy solution to
this conundrum. They would simply make such aggression an
international crime and give it an international forum for trial.
The ICC statute, for example, opens the possibility for the ICC
to have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression-the traditional
category of jus ad bellum, the law governing the resort to force
rather than simply the law governing the conduct of
combatants.86 But this would require agreement as to the
substance, as well as the justiciability, of aggression. This
enterprise, for many sound reasons, has failed since
Nuremberg. The nascent United Nations, through its Charter,
left the determination of what constitutes a threat to
international peace and security solely to the political
discretion of the Security Council, thus wiping out what the
American prosecutor at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson, thought
was his finest achievement in making the crime of aggression
judicially cognizable. In addition to the Security Council, a state
under both the U.N. Charter and customary international
law retains its customary right of self-defense and, by
85. Gonzales, supra note 5, at A25.
86. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 5(1)(d),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
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implication, at least partly its independent judgment as to what
constitutes aggression requiring sef-defense. This independent
determination, also valid under customary law of self-defense,
underlies the U.S. basis for armed action in this conflict.
Given the existence of sound reasons for not judicially
criminalizing aggression, its punishment becomes harder to
conceive-at least in a world in which people are conditioned
to believe that punishment must always be judicially mandated.
With respect to those who we capture who are, as I argued
earlier, criminals as well as our enemies-those who are
criminals, but not criminals within the sense of a domestic or
political order, and who by their actions and ideology have
made themselves our enemies-we are left in a moral
quandary. If our enemies were destroyed in battle, then that
may be taken as punishment enough. Aggression defeated and
punished in the same action. But what about those whom we
capture? We try them for crimes, war crimes and domestic
crimes, that do not wholly satisfy our sense of their evil acts,
and yet we do not believe, either, that those who are outside of
our domestic political arrangements ought to be treated as
ordinary criminals.
This is part of the moral argument that takes us to military
commissions, because they permit us to treat these accused
with a form of due process, but which is a process unlike that
given to ordinary criminals. If what is most objected to, at
bottom, in the establishment of military commissions under the
Military Order, is that they leave to the political determination
of the President and his political appointees which individuals,
within certain categories, may be subjected to them-well, that
is also their moral virtue. The determination of who is not
merely a criminal, but a criminal who is also an enemy is, and
ought to remain, a fundamentally political decision. It requires
a finding of criminality by a court-criminality in the sense of
ordinary crimes or war crimes. This judicial finding of
criminality, however, is a determination to be made by the
military commission after it has received a suspect by referral
from the President. And while the President ought to make a
referral in part because he has a serious reason to think that
domestic or international law of war has been violated, in part
the President should act only because he has determined that
this person has committed aggression against the United States,
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
and is therefore an enemy of the United States. The procedure
for a referral to a military commission does not treat aggression
as a justiciable crime, but neither does it simply ignore the
moral reality of it.
It is incontrovertible that commissions grant great power to
the Presidency, to the Commander in Chief, and therefore
ought to be exercised with great caution. But they do have the
virtue of addressing a great moral gap. It is one we lived with
in punishing McVeigh because, in the end, he was both an
enemy and one of "ours." With Al Qaeda suspects who are not
citizens and who are either unlawfully in the United States or
beyond our shores, we have little, indeed no, reason to do so.
A military commission must be free to determine whether or
not allegations of criminality are true or not, impartially and
dispassionately, and what punishment, if any, might be
deserved. But the determination that someone is an enemy of
the United States, and therefore subject to this forum for trying
their alleged criminality -is a political, not a judicial, decision.
Judges determine who is guilty of a crime. Political authorities
determine the identity of our nation's enemies. Military
commissions must be invoked with vigilance for their
propensity to threaten civil liberties, but the initial judgment of
who -standing outside the embrace of the Constitution and on
account of aggression-is an enemy of the United States is
finally and properly one for the political branches of
democratic government.
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